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ABSTRACT
In order to defend his controversial claim that observation is unaided perception, Bas van 
Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, suggested that, for all we know, the 
images produced by a microscope could be in a situation analogous to that of the rainbows, 
which are ‘images of nothing’. He added that reflections in the water, rainbows, and the like 
are ‘public hallucinations’, but it is not clear whether this constitutes an ontological cate-
gory apart or an empty set. In this paper an argument will be put forward to the effect that 
rainbows can be thought of as events, that is, as part of a subcategory of entities that van 
Fraassen has always considered legitimate phenomena. I argue that rainbows are actually 
not images in the relevant (representational) sense and that there is no need to ontological-
ly inflate the category of entities in order to account for them, which would run counter to 
the empiricist principle of parsimony. 
Keywords: constructive empiricism, observability, observation, public hallucination, rain-
bow, van Fraassen.
Since Aristotle, rainbows have been the object of interest of many philosophers and scien-
tists throughout the centuries. Bas van Fraassen, the originator of constructive empiricism, has 
recently dealt with them too (2001 and 2008). While his focus is on the (alleged) possibility of 
performing an observation with the aid of a microscope, his account of rainbows ends up raising a 
new issue, concerning the ontological status of these arcs. In this paper it will be shown that there 
is a tension in van Fraassen’s 2001 account of rainbows, which is not completely solved in his fur-
ther work (2008). I argue that this tension can be solved by considering rainbows as events and 
will show that not only does this hypothesis overcome the objections van Fraassen raises against 
considering a rainbow as a thing, it also complies with the empiricist principle of parsimony.
***
No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s 
not the same river and he’s not the same man. 
Heraclitus
Heraclitus’ famous saying has a clear meaning. Yet, while hardly anybody would deny that 
the Ephesian philosopher has a point, we still call the Nile the longest river in the world and do 
not tend to doubt that it’s the same river that had a crucial role in the development of Egyptian 
civilization; nor do we deny it’s the same watercourse whose source David Livingstone became 
obsessed with finding in the second half of the nineteenth century. “Rivers have well e ablished 
identity conditions”, we might reply to any critic of our position, provided there is any. But some 
neo-Heraclitean might insist that when a slave in Thebes looked at the Nile, the poor man was 
not seeing the same river that a farmer in Qau was staring at, because the portions of water the 
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two were observing were not the same. Then, of course, the 
watercourse some might observe in the modern Qaw el-Ke-
bir nowadays would also be something different, because the 
portion of water the farmer in ancient Qau was seeing is very 
likely no longer part of the Nile.
Roger Bacon’s account of rainbows does not seem too far 
from this neo-Heraclitean per ective. According to the me-
dieval scientist and philosopher, each observer sees his own 
bow, different from every other observer’s, because the sets of 
raindrops responsible for it are different (they depend on the 
point of view) (see Kraml, 1994, p. 356). Now, almost eight 
centuries have passed since Bacon’s theory of the rainbow and 
contemporary accounts of the coloured arc are much more 
refined. Still, the empiricist van Fraassen seems to take Ba-
con’s point: “I see a rainbow and you say you see it too. See what 
too? You are not seeing the rainbow I see, for yours is located 
in a different place. (I assume that you are not looking from 
inside my head)” (van Fraassen, 2001, p. 156).2 The Dutch phi-
losopher made the same point a few years later, adding: “Nor 
are they simply in a different place in our re ective visual 
fields, in the way the clouds are. For if that were so, we would 
see the colours ‘attached’ to the same part of the cloud, mod-
ulo parallax” (van Fraassen, 2008, p. 102).
Van Fraassen’s interest in the rainbow is part of his strat-
egy to defend the notorious claim that observation is (at least 
in principle) unaided perception (see van Fraassen, 2001, 
p. 154, 2008, p. 93). Accordingly, endorsing such a chara er-
ization of observation means, among other things, denying 
that we actually see a paramecium when we detect one by 
means of a microscope.3 In order to defend such a contro-
versial stance, van Fraassen suggests one should not think of 
microscopes as ‘windows into the invisible or sub-visible level 
of nature’ but rather as devices creating new observable phe-
nomena. In the case of the microscopes, says van Fraassen, the 
products are images. True, they could be images of something 
real, as happens with reflections in water, but there is no way 
of empirically proving this (see Kusch, 2013, p. 13). For all 
we know, the situation could very well be the same as in the 
case of a rainbow. A rainbow is obviously not the image of a 
real arch; in fact it is not the image of anything — but it is 
an image (see van Fraassen’s catalogue of images in his 2008, 
p. 104). How can we be sure that, in the case of the images 
produced by a microscope, the situation is not the same? We 
cannot. It certainly is not irrational to maintain an agnostic 
stand towards them, then.
Van Fraassen thinks he can include the rainbow among 
the images because it lacks certain crucial invariances that 
would allow us to represent it as ‘a thing’,4 as in the previous 
argument about the rainbow being different depending on 
the point of view. However, it exhibits other invariances that 
reflections exhibit too. As with reflections and other imag-
es, rainbows are not ‘things’; they are something else (‘public 
hallucinations’ is the label van Fraassen gives to rainbows and 
reflections — together with shadows, mirages, and fata mor-
ganas). But they are all kin.
Considering the rainbow as an image could be question-
able, of course, and I will return to this point later on, but it 
is certainly convenient for his purposes. Van Fraassen did not 
content himself with this manoeuvre, though. When he first 
presented his view on rainbows and other images, in 2001, he 
added: “We never see images, because images do not exist” 
(p. 158). This obviously created a tension with the claim that 
microscopes generate “truly humanly observable phenomena” 
(p. 154) — and was not needed, perhaps, but helped avoiding 
other problems, such as explaining what images are. About this 
 ecific point, however, van Fraassen seems to have retreated a 
few years later and in his last book (2008), wrote: “When you 
see the reflection of a tree in water you are not seeing a thing; 
a reflection is not nothing, it is something, but it is not a thing, 
not a material object” (p. 105). Reflections exist, then, and so 
do rainbows. And if we see them, then they are observable. Van 
Fraassen’s equivalence between phenomena and observables 
(see Bourgeois, 1987, p. 305; but also Foss, 1984, 1991) is thus 
ree ablished. But now that rainbows’ existence is no longer de-
nied, perhaps van Fraassen should tell us what they are. 
He tells us what they are not: “Rainbows are not objects, 
events or processes” (van Fraassen, 2008, p. 110). Still, they 
must be some kind of entity, because ‘to observe’ is a success 
verb.5 In their case, however, says Al ector-Kelly, it does not 
seem possible to identify the objects of our experience with 
material objects. Then perhaps van Fraassen should admit 
that when we have the experience of seeing a rainbow, what 
2 Bacon’s view seems to be shared by many, in fact. Talking about the rainbow, in the classic Physics of the Air (1929), for example, Wil-
liam Jackson Humphreys writes: “as the eyes of two observers must always be separated by a greater or less distance, their bows must 
also be correspondingly separated and different—different in the sense that they have different positions and are produced by different 
drops. […] it follows that two observers do not, and cannot, see the same rainbow” (p. 479). If we were to endorse such a view, howev-
er, shouldn’t we add that an observer can never see the same rainbow twice, because the drops that produce it change continuously?
3 According to van Fraassen, to detect is to be distinguished from to observe: “Microscopes, cloud chambers, laser interferometers and 
other scientific instruments allow us to detect entities, but detection has to be carefully distinguished from observation. A look through a 
microscope does not allow us to observe directly a paramecium; only to observe an image of a paramecium, or to detect a paramecium” 
(Contessa, 2006, p. 456). See also van Fraassen (2008, p. 93).
4 Tacitly implying that it does not have definite identity conditions?
5 According to van Fraassen, “we can’t see things that don’t exist” (2001, p. 158) and “[t]he term ‘observable’ classifies putative en-
tities (entities which may or may not exist)” (1980, p. 15). If we do see rainbows, then of course they must be observable. Therefore, 
a rainbow is an entity (which exists, he now admits). Van Fraassen claimed that rainbows are (observable) phenomena even before 
admitting their existence, however, and, to him, ‘phenomena’ and ‘observables’ amount to the same thing (see Bourgeois, 1987, 
p. 305)—hence the tension.
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we are actually seeing are sense-data (see Al ector-Kelly, 
2004, p. 338; see also Foss, 1991, p. 279). 
However, it is hard to think that van Fraassen could now 
be willing to admit that sense data exist, as he has always—
and strongly—denied their existence (see 1980, p. 72; 2008, 
p. 218). On the other hand, if ‘public hallucinations’ are not 
objects, events, or processes, do we have to conclude that they 
constitute another ontological category (or subcategory of 
the entities, as with objects, processes, events)? Well, before 
jumping to such a conclusion, perhaps we should remember 
that, like any good empiricist, “van Fraassen appeals to the vir-
tues of ontological parsimony” and tries to avoid ‘inflationary 
metaphysics’ (Kukla, 2000, p. 64). In this case it is not clear 
that he is a ing according to these principles, though.
Thus, if we do not want to inflate the category of the 
entities or to deny that images exist—which would force us 
to deny that they are phenomena too, on pain of contradic-
tion—perhaps we could try to see whether the rainbow al-
lows us to represent it as one of the three subcategories of en-
tities that van Fraassen always (and only) mentions: objects, 
events, and processes. My opinion is that, contrary to what 
he maintains, it is possible to describe the rainbow as being an 
object.6 However, an even more convincing argument can be 
put forward in order to defend that the rainbow is an event—
while at the same time saving “van Fraassen’s reasonable belief 
that talk about ‘objects, events, and quantities’ (1980, p. 58) is 
intertranslatable” (Foss 1991, p. 279, n. 2).
As a matter of fact, as is well known, a rainbow is cre-
ated by the intera ion of the Sun’s rays and water droplets 
su ended in the air, and this is how it is usually described in 
physics books (see, for example, Barnes-Svarney and Svar-
ney, 1999, p. 42). That is to say, the rainbow can be con-
ceived as an event (an intera ion), commonly described in 
terms of the objects involved, in exactly the way van Fraas-
sen would expect.
And what about his objection that what actually hap-
pens is that each observer sees ‘something different’? A char-
a erization of the rainbow as an object would be immune 
from such an argument for it is part of the common use of 
the verb ‘to observe’ to say that two different agents observe 
the same object even when each one looks at a different side 
of it (think of an astronaut being on the other side of the 
Moon).7 Could the menace be brought back by a different 
chara erization of the rainbow? Classifying it as an event, in 
fact, seems more ‘natural’ than conceiving it as an object—it 
is actually quite common to find the rainbow described by the 
locution atmospheric event. Is this a legitimate use, despite van 
Fraassen’s objection?
Let’s consider an example of an event that he mentions in 
The Scientific Image: a car accident (see 1980, p. 15)—being an 
event, not only can it be observed, but also, as said above, it can 
be described/reduced, even if not completely, in terms of the 
involved objects.8 A couple of years ago, a crash involving an 
ambulance and a truck occurred on a Brazilian interstate high-
way. According to the police report, when the truck, loaded 
with sugar cane, joined the highway, coming from a side road, 
it was hit in the side by the ambulance. The truck driver prob-
ably left the side road without checking whether other vehicles 
were already on the highway and did not see the ambulance 
approaching. Inside the ambulance, a woman was lying on a 
stretcher, being taken from one hospital to another. At the mo-
ment of the collision, the truck driver only heard the noise of 
the crash between the vehicles. The woman inside the ambu-
lance only saw the vehicle body deforming all of a sudden, but 
did not hear anything, because she is deaf. A pump manager, 
who works in a gas station about four hundred yards from the 
crash site, saw the two vehicles collide.
Each one of the three saw or heard ‘different things’. Still, we 
say that they all observed the same car accident. Indeed, when 
we consider an event, such as a march in protest against the war 
in Iraq, a tornado in Oklahoma City, an earthquake in Japan, etc., 
it is more than likely that two different individuals who observed 
the event at hand actually saw or heard something different from 
one another. Even so, we say they observed the same event. Why 
can’t we do the same in the case of the rainbow? 
If a car crash is an event, and as such observable, the same 
goes for a march on Fifth Avenue, for the lightning that stroke 
St. Peter’s Basilica the day the Pope resigned, and for the rainbow 
that shone over São Paulo a couple of days ago. The rationale 
behind these events seems to be the same, pace van Fraassen.
The strongest objection against this kind of chara eri-
zation, however, concerns the subjective side of this phenom-
enon, which van Fraassen seems to stress. The argument, in 
brief, is that events such as a car accident, a march on Fifth 
Avenue, or an earthquake ‘exist out there’ and happen irre-
 ective of the presence of a perceiving subject, while a ‘pub-
lic hallucination’ such as a rainbow requires that something 
happens in the agent’s eye or mind in order to ‘exist’. In oth-
er words, according to this view, if there is no observer then 
there is no rainbow.
But if that is the case, why should we treat a rainbow 
differently from the pain one feels when hit by a stone, for 
6 One argument to this effect is that if the point is having well-established identity conditions, then a rainbow does not seem to be in a 
very different situation from a cloud.
7 In philosophical discussion the word ‘observe’ is meant to have a common use (see van Fraassen, 1992, p. 18).
8 As a matter of fact, defending the intertranslatability of objects, events, and processes—which is legitimate—does not amount to 
saying that, for example, an event can be completely described/reduced in terms of the objects that took part in it (and vice versa). An 
event is generated by the objects involved (of course), but there is also ‘something else’ (an action, that is, some kind of occurrence or 
change in the world), that turns the occurrence in question into a legitimate event; but that, for this very same reason, makes it impos-
sible for the event to be completely reduced to the involved objects only.
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example? True, the former can be photographed while the 
latter cannot; however, in both cases, while it is something ex-
ternal that provokes it, the sensation is completely subjective 
and cannot be shared with anybody.9 If the perceiving subject 
plays a decisive role in the rainbow’s generation, but even so 
it is observed and is a phenomenon, then Albert’s stress, the 
goalie’s anxiety at the penalty kick, and any other sensation 
one can think of should represent instances of observations 
and phenomena. But there exist good reasons to resist this 
conclusion and van Fraassen seems to agree with this.10
Otherwise, it would be more coherent, in this situation, 
‘to finish the job’ and deny that a rainbow can actually be ob-
served, as the Dutch philosopher did in 2001, when he said 
that it is a hallucination (it was probably not by accident that 
he used this term, although he added the adjective ‘public’); 
but then, to avoid contradiction, he should also have denied 
that it is a phenomenon—unless he used this word ‘for the 
sake of the argument’ only, because the rainbow is usually de-
scribed as an ‘optical phenomenon’.
Indeed, with regard to the alleged observations of rain-
bows, in the paper van Fraassen writes: “These observations 
are like hallucinations, in that they are not of real things, but they 
are public”11 (van Fraassen, 2001, p. 156, my emphasis). And 
when, on the same page, he says: “You are not seeing the rain-
bow I see, for yours is located in a different place”, he then clar-
ifies this claim by adding: “I assume that you are not looking 
from inside my head” (my emphasis). Moreover, he also denies 
that ‘public hallucinations’ exist, as mentioned, and this could 
make one think that he is actually considering the rainbow as 
a hallucination, that is, something subjective (as with sensa-
tions). But then he should have finished the job, as I also said 
above, and (also) denied both that rainbows are phenomena 
and that science should account for them, pace Foss. He stops 
halfway, instead, and generates a contradiction (also stressed 
by Al ector-Kelly, 2004): according to ‘2001’s van Fraassen’, 
rainbows do not exist and we do not see them. Even so, they 
are phenomena and must be accommodated in the conceptu-
al framework that constitutes a scientific theory.
In sum, if it is true that without the observer there is 
no rainbow, then denying its existence and observability —
and the fact that it is a phenomenon, for which science should ac-
count—would be the correct thing to do, although contrary to 
common sense.
Van Fraassen, however, seems to have recently retreat-
ed, but it is not clear to what extent. He now claims that we 
do see rainbows, reflections in the water, etc. (therefore they 
exist), but continues to deny that they are objects, events, or 
processes. Nonetheless, if they are phenomena and we ob-
serve them, then they must be intersubjective and ‘exist out 
there’, and must allow us to describe them in terms of the 
objects involved (or, in alternative, must allow us to describe 
them as objects)—unless we are willing to assume that the 
category of entities also accommodates a subcategory called 
‘public hallucinations’, in addition to the subcategories ‘ob-
jects’, ‘events’, and ‘processes’. But this seems to run counter 
the empiricist principle of ontological parsimony and could 
perhaps be avoided. In this paper an attempt to achieve this 
has been made.12
Another way of accounting for rainbows and other im-
ages, once it is admitted that we can observe them, would in 
fact be considering that ‘public hallucinations’ constitute an 
ontological category apart from objects, events, and process-
es, but belong, together with them, one level above, to the 
class of entities. The problem is that if, according to a certain 
interpretation of van Fraassen’s works, one can say that the 
Dutch philosopher has always admitted that among the en-
tities there is something more than ‘just’ objects, events, and 
processes, only recently has he conceded that rainbows and 
other images exist. Before 2008, ‘public hallucinations’ did not 
constitute an ontological category (apart)—or if they did, it 
was an empty set, since, according to van Fraassen, its ‘ele-
ments’ did not exist.
9 Some might argue that a photograph of a rainbow allows us to share it, contrary to what we have just said. However, in this case, what 
would actually be seen is a photograph, which represents a rainbow, and not the phenomenon itself. If we admit that the rainbow is 
somehow generated (also) by the observer, then it cannot be shared, although various observers can have an analogous experience 
under the same conditions.
10 If, on the one hand, van Fraassen claims that, when two different individuals say they are observing the same rainbow, this is not 
what actually happens, on the other hand he admits that the rainbow can be photographed, which seems to amount to claiming that 
this natural phenomenon is both publicly and intersubjectively accessible—it is no coincidence that he calls it a ‘public hallucination’, of 
course. It is worth adding that Foss considers ‘things’ such as the rainbows “objectively accessible phenomena, or at least sufficiently 
intersubjectively accessible to get full scientific consideration” (Foss, 1991, p. 281). If science investigates the world around us, then 
the object of an observation has to be external and intersubjectively accessible (so that a mathematical model can be built in order to 
represent it) (see van Fraassen, 2008, p. 168, 238; Giere, 2009, p. 107-108). This surely is so for van Fraassen: “Locke and Berkeley, of 
course, were sensationalists. For them appearances were of internal, mental entities. Van Fraassen will have no truck with such things. 
His appearances are public” (Giere, 2009, p. 107). If microscopes “create phenomena, to be accounted for by our theories” (van Fraas-
sen, 2008, p. 101), then these must be public. Accordingly, the same argument applies to all images, rainbows included—but not to 
headaches and the like.
11 Van Fraassen does not restrict himself to drawing an analogy between rainbows and hallucinations, but does actually consider the 
former to be part of a category of phenomena that, as has been said, he names ‘public hallucinations’: “reflections in the water, mirror 
images, mirages, rainbows. For those I will use the term ‘public hallucinations’” (van Fraassen, 2001, p. 159-160; the very same sentence 
can also be found in 2008, p. 105).
12 This is just an attempt. A more accurate study would certainly require proposing identity conditions allowing us to precisely define 
and identify rainbows and the like.
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In conclusion, it seems preferable—and constitutes a 
proposal for a solution of what could be called ‘the rainbow 
issue’—to classify, contra van Fraassen, this phenomenon as an 
event, which can be described (but not completely reduced) 
in terms of the objects involved. Moreover, I argue that it 
should not be considered an image either.13 Despite looking 
like a bow, in fact, as its name obviously suggests, it actually 
does not replicate (and does not look like) any known mate-
rial arc—as even van Fraassen acknowledges. In other words, 
including rainbows among images can even be legitimate, but 
if we want to stick to the representational role of the latter, 
this choice seems questionable. Images must be images of 
something, otherwise we could include among them dog-
shaped clouds or the Italian Peninsula, for it resembles a boot. 
These are actually more entitled to be considered images of 
something than a rainbow, which is clearly not an image in 
this sense, for it does not replicate anything.14
Including rainbows among events seems more natural 
and, in particular, closer to the empiricist spirit than ‘ontolog-
ically inflating’ entities and considering, as van Fraassen seems 
to do, that among them there is also a class of the ‘public hal-
lucinations’ —whose nature, indeed, would remain a mystery.
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While I disagree with considering the latter as images, his strategy is clear: there exist phenomena that certainly are ‘images of some-
thing’, such as reflections in water, and others that certainly are ‘images of nothing’, such as rainbows. In the case of an image produced 
by a microscope, however, there is no way of (empirically) knowing whether they represent something real or not. This being so, main-
taining an agnostic stance towards them cannot be considered irrational (van Fraassen could have called them ‘putative images’ then!). 
Even so, it is important to note that, according to van Fraassen, microscopes are devices that systematically create new phenomena, 
“that must also be saved by our theories, suffice to refute theories to be discarded, and serve to gather empirical information” (van 
Fraassen, 2008, p. 100). An anonymous referee of this journal (whom I thank for giving me the opportunity to clarify my position) sug-
gests that, on the other hand, by considering a rainbow as an event and, consequently, that when someone sees a rainbow what she is 
observing is an interaction between light rays and water droplets, I am actually making an important concession to the scientific realist. 
For in the case of microscopic images, says the referee, since they are created by the interaction of microscopic objects, this perspec-
tive would imply that, after all, what we observe are the microscopic objects. I disagree with this objection, however, for at least two 
important reasons: (i) I do not think rainbows should be considered images (I used the locution ‘images of nothing’ for the sake of the 
argument, but if they are ‘of nothing’, then they are not images to me) and this suffices to ‘break the parallel’ between rainbows and 
microscopic images—observing a rainbow is on a par with observing a car crash or any other event, instead, even with respect to the 
empirical information that can be gathered; (ii) by saying that microscopic images are created by the interaction of microscopic objects, 
not only is the referee making a huge concession to the realist, but begging the question too! For of course, whether there actually 
are microscopic objects ‘out there’ (or, at least, that we can have any knowledge of them) is what is at stake in the realism/anti-realism 
debate. For all we know —a van Fraassian could object—the output of a microscope could very well be the result of a mere interaction 
between light rays and the microscope itself—or ‘noise’, to use a word that is common in microscopy.
